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Romantic Agonies: Human Suffering and 
the Ethical Sublime 
Terryl L. Givens and Anthony P. Russell 
Speaking of the painted screams of the artist Francis Bacon, Arthur Danto 
writes: 
These depicted screams seem to entitle us to some inference that they at least 
express an attitude of despair or outrage or condemnation, and that in the 
medium of extreme gesture the artist is registering a moral view toward the 
conditions that account for scream upon scream upon scream. How pro-
foundly disillusioning it is then to read the artist saying, in a famous inter-
view ... , "I've always hoped in a sense to be able to paint the mouth like 
Monet painted a sunset." As if, standing before one of these canvases, 13acon 
were to say, "Well, there, I think, I very nearly got a screaming mouth as it 
should be painted. Damned hard to do." ... To paint a scream because it 
is a difficult thing to paint, where the difficulty is not at all emotional but 
technical, like doing a figure in extreme foreshortening or capturing the eva-
nescent pinks of sunrise over misting water, is really a form of perversion. 
As a perversion, it marks this strange artist's entire corpus. It is like a rack 
maker who listens to the screams of the racked only as evidence that he has done 
a fine job. It is inhuman. As humans, however, we cannot be indifferent to 
screams. We are accordingly victims ourselves, manipulated in our moral being 
by an art that has no such being, though it looks as if it must. It is for this rea-
son that I hate Bacon's art. 1 
Before resuming his account of Margaret's tragic sufferings in the second 
halfofBook I of Wordsworth's Excursion, the Wanderer echoes Danto's 
reaction to Bacon's "perverse" aestheticism by considering the disturbing 
possibility that his own narrative is merely a vehicle of aesthetic pleasure: 
It were a wantonness, and would demand 
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Severe reproof, if we were men whose hearts 
Could hold vain dalliance with the misery 
Even of the dead; contented thence to draw 
A momentary pleasure, never marked 
By reason, barren of all future good. (626-31 )2 
Both Danto and the Wanderer raise a problematic issue. What are the 
moral implications of using human suffering as the stuff of aesthetic cre-
ation and pleasure? The necessary objectification of human experience 
out of which a work of art is formed seems particularly troubling when the 
experience in question is pain. Both Danto and the Wanderer can only 
justify aesthetic depictions of human misery if they serve a morally uplift-
ing function. Representations of suffering must either register personal 
outrage and condemnation of its causes or, as the Wanderer puts it, must 
motivate "thoughts ... to virtue friendly" (634). 
And yet it is difficult to see how the inclusion of a morally edifying 
"attitude" in the work of art dispenses with our original qualms, since 
providing aesthetic pleasure remains nonetheless a central function of the 
object of art. As Dylan Thomas implies in "Refusal to Mourn the Death, 
by Fire, ofa Child in London," moral edification can simply become an-
other poetic trope, however emotionally satisfying. "Never," he writes, 
Shall I let pray the shadow of a sound 
Or sow my salt seed 
In the least valley of sackcloth to mourn 
The m~jesty and burning of the child's death. 
I shall not murder 
The mankind of her going with a grave truth 
Nor blaspheme down the stations of the breath 
With any further 
Elegy of innocence and youth. ( I 0-18) 
However uplifting the elegist's intentions may be, Thomas suggests, the 
assimilation of death and suffering into a language of formal structures and 
grim puns about "grave" truths is a kind of blasphemy no better than Ba-
con's studied dispassion. The perversely parasitic relationship between art 
and human anguish ultimately cannot be concealed by the inclusion of 
moral consolation in the former. Such consolation may well be little more 
than an anaesthetic permitting our indulgence in the aesthetic. This essay 
examines two poems depicting human anguish in order to explore a cur-
rent in Romantic thought that implicitly yields some original and compel-
ling insights regarding the problematic relationship between art and suffer-
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ing. The focus is primarily on Wordsworth's narrative of Margaret's suf-
fering in The Excursion, then more briefly on Shelley's Prometheus Un-
bound. In both cases Kant's ideas about the sublime provide us with a  
useful perspective from which to understand the issues these poems raise. · 
Wordsworth's self-conscious engagement with the question of art and 
suffering in Book I of The Excursion is perhaps the most sustained from 
the Romantic period.3 Indeed, Wordsworth's frequent and often radical 
revisions of this poem, originally known as "The Ruined Cottage," from 
1797-98 to 1845, reveal that the representation of human anguish was a 
persistent concern throughout his life. The poem, as James Butler has 
demonstrated in his brilliant reconstruction of its various redactions, was 
originally "a powerful representation of domestic tragedy, stark in its bare 
essentials" (14). Subsequent versions, however, backed away from this 
unmediated display of human misery, reflecting Wordsworth's increasing 
sense that such suffering had somehow to be made explicitly meaningful 
to prevent its becoming the occasion for a "momentary pleasure." In MS. 
B (1798), Wordsworth added the moralizing transition between Parts I and 
II quoted above, and introduced Margaret's tale with a philosophical biog-
raphy of the Pedlar (known in the Excursion as the Wanderer), describing 
his intuitive sense of the enduring harmony underlying nature (Butler 10).4 
These additions provided the groundwork for the reader's proper response 
to the woman's travails. Consolation is to be found, the poem now sug-
gested, in the fact that Margaret's life and death are part of a coherent 
"total pattern" in nature (Wordsworth, Music of Humanity 147). In MS. 
D (I 799), Wordsworth removed the Pedlar's history but added a conclud-
ing passage in which the interlocutor is admonished not to react with de-
spair to the tale he has heard. A more enlightened outlook on nature, the 
Pedlar advises, reveals that "what we feel of sorrow and despair/ From 
ruin and from change" is only an "idle dream" (Butler 75). 
The more Wordsworth reworked this poem, the more he seemed to feel 
the need to soften the impact of Margaret's sufferings. The title itself of 
MS. E (1803-4), "The Pedlar," betrays the poet's changed emphasis on 
consolation. "The Pedlar" includes the moral transition from MS. B, the 
consoling reflections with which MS. D closes, and a much expanded 
history of the Pedlar preceding Margaret's story. This poem, which even-
tually became the first book of The Excursion, delineates even more clear-
ly than in previous versions the metaphysical concept of the One Life 
which is at the basis of Wordsworth's vision of moral consolation.5 For 
example, Wordsworth informs us that the Pedlar's education at the hands 
of nature led to his serene awareness that "All things ... breathed immor-
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tality" (Butler 400). The inner peace derived from this "Sublime and 
comprehensive" perspective (400), the poet claims, allowed the Pedlar "to 
suffer/ With them whom he saw suffer" without succumbing to despair 
( 41 O). Eventually, however, even this Coleridgean philosophical contain-
ment of human misery must have seemed insufficient to Wordsworth. In 
the 1845 and 1849-50 versions of The Excursion, he further reinforced the 
moral framework of this tale by incorporating Christian sources of conso-
lation as well. The Pedlar-now named the Wanderer-tells his grieving 
companion that it is to the Cross that one must ultimately turn for consola-
tion that "springs,/ From sources deeper far than deepest pain,/ For the 
meek Sufferer" (PW938-39). 
Wordsworth's commitment to providing an edifying moral through his 
representation of Margaret's anguish is most startlingly conveyed in a line 
from The Excursion's conclusion that was retained in all versions of this 
narrative after 1798. The line in question appears at the end of a passage 
describing the Wanderer's reflections upon passing by the ruined cottage, 
with its overgrown vegetation, in the aftermath of Margaret's death: 
I well remember that those very plumes, 
Those weeds, and the high spear-grass on that wall, 
Oy mist and silent rain-drops silvered o'er, 
As once I passed, into my heart conveyed 
So still an image of tranquillity, 
So calm and still, and looked so beautiful 
Amid the uneasy thoughts that filled my mind, 
That what we feel of sorrow and despair 
From ruin and from change, and all the grief 
That passing shows of 13eing leave behind, 
Appeared an idle dream, that could maintain, 
Nowhere, dominion o'er the enlightened spirit 
Whose meditative sympathies repose 
Upon the breast of Faith. I turned away, 
And walked along my road in happiness. (I' W 942-56) 
One is tempted to speculate that Wordsworth's visions and revisions of 
the "Ruined Cottage" from 1799 onward constituted so many attempts to 
create a poem that could bear the weight of the last verse of this passage. 
Indeed, this line focuses almost unbearably the challenge that the poem as 
a whole undertakes. Its justification for representing Margaret's suffering 
depends on a reader's willingness to embrace its metaphysics of consola-
tion. With a rather chilling logic, Wordsworth suggests in this line that if 
this consoling vision is truly embraced, human suffering must necessarily 
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become an occasion for happiness.6 
The wry fact that this verse startles, of course, betrays Wordsworth's 
failure to convince us of its appropriateness. There is something disturb-
ingly smug and self-serving in the Wanderer's ability to walk on not in 
sadness or reflection, but in happiness. Indeed, it is perhaps revealing that 
though the many accretions to the original "Ruined Cottage" were meant 
to provide an audience with more than a "momentary pleasure" artfully 
crafted out of human suffering, the final version of this poem, completed 
forty-eight years later, climaxes with an experience of aesthetic pleasure. 
The stages in Margaret's tragic decline, we recall, are poignantly embodied 
by the steady, irresistible encroachment ofpost-lapsarian chaos upon the 
small Eden of the cottage. On one of his last visits to Margaret's hut, the 
Wanderer enters the garden and sees "More plainly still," 
that poverty and grief 
Were now come nearer to her: weeds defaced 
The hardened soil, and knots of withered grass: 
No ridges there appeared of clear black mould, 
No winter greenness; of her herbs and flowers, 
It seemed the better part were gnawed away 
Or trampled into earth ... (833-39) 
It is this same scene of desolation and disrepair-"silvered o'er" by rain 
(944)-that the Wanderer will later describe as conveying "an image of 
tranquillity" so beautiful that it constitutes a manifestation of profound 
metaphysical truths from whose perspective human misery can be seen as 
ephemeral, inconsequential (946). The Wanderer's happiness, it would 
seem, depends ultimately on an aestheticization of the scene of Margaret's 
suffering. Reified by the rain's silver patina into an object of beauty, the 
garden masks the ugly reality of Margaret's anguish. To what degree, we 
may ask, does the metaphysics of consolation in this poem perform a 
similar function to that of the rain?7 
In this context, it is instructive to recall the facts of Margaret's story. 
They include blight, hunger, illness, death, dissolution, wretchedness, and 
more death. The motifs, significantly, are ones that reinforce the theme of 
futility: "the useless fragments of a wooden bowl," (an objective correla-
tive that portends and epitomizes the entire story); the inevitable decay of 
the cottage as a consequence of Margaret's negligence; her "unutterably 
helpless" grief (656); the "little power" the Wanderer has to comfort her 
(683); the "helpless" infant who is finally "self-stilled" in the presence of 
an even more agonizingly helpless mother (737). 
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The cumulative effect of such a litany of futility is the total failure of hu-
man action and human understanding alike in the face of insurmountable 
misery. Indeed, nothing in the Wanderer's tale justifies his later claim that, 
"in her worst distress," Margaret "had ofttimes felt/ The unbounded might· 
of prayer," or that she had patiently endured her anguish "with soul/ fixed 
on the Cross" (935-37). In point of fact, what is most affecting about 
Margaret's story is not the extent of her losses-"'Tis a common talc," 
after all, of"ordinary sorrow" (637-38)-rather, it is Margaret's inability 
to recover from her grief that is most tragic. Wordsworth even hints at the 
fact that her infant essentially died of neglect. 8 God never in fact grants 
her the "patience to endure" that she hopes for in her one and only refer-
ence to a transcendent source of consolation (775). In Wordsworth's po-
etry, Jonathan Wordsworth notes, "the love of God is frequently no bless-
ing" (251 ), ·and indeed the Wanderer's exhortation to Margaret to trust in 
1-1 is "good love" (808) is undercut by his earlier admission that her hus-
band's disappearance is ultimately attributable to the fact that "it pleased 
Heaven" to bring on the "plague of war" (538, 539). Margaret's reaction 
to the Wanderer's moral exhortation-"but for my hope/ it seemed she did 
not thank me"-betrays the extent of her despair (812-13). The reality is 
that Margaret spent nine years waiting expectantly for a husband who 
never returned, for succor that never came, and ceased the cycle of vain 
hope and frustrated faith when death, not peace, overcame her. Nine 
years, we are told, of "heart wasting"-a crucial and excruciating expres-
sion (875). In this context, the Wanderer's attempts to make of Margaret 
an emblem of patient Christian long-suffering are dismally deficient. 
References to faith, the Cross, and the "unbounded might of prayer" seem 
to gloss over, with a cold silver sheen, a darker truth (936). From this 
perspective, that is, Wordsworth's morally edifying poem desensitizes us 
to human suffering-transforms it into a hollow source of self-serving 
pleasure no different, in essence, from purely aesthetic pleasure. 9 
The troubling inconsistencies between the facts of Margaret's story and 
the Wanderer's assessment of its meaning suggest a reading of this poem 
contradicting the traditional view that it presents a vision of moral and 
metaphysical consolation based on a confluence of ideas about the One 
Life and Christian revelation. Indeed, by emphasizing these inconsisten-
cies it would almost appear that the poem's real agenda is precisely to 
point out the inefficacy or inadequacy oftheodicy as a basis for reconcilia-
tion to human suffering. In point of fact, Wordsworth's poem allows for 
a third reading that eschews the disadvantageous extremes of these two 
alternatives. Such a reading requires us to examine Wordsworth's poem 
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in light of Kantian conceptions of morality and the sublime. What con-
nects Wordsworth's poem to these conceptions is the element of failure 
that is central to the grammar or structure of the sublime as articulated by 
Kant. Theresa Kelly, in "Wordsworth, Kant, and the Romantic Sublime," 
neatly summarizes Kant's concept of the sublime as follows: 
The mind discovers the sublime as the imagination attempts to encompass 
nature's magnitude (the 'mathematically sublime') or to resist its might (the 
'dynamical sublime'). The imagination fails in this attempt, but reason recog-
nizes in this failure a power ... which surpasses [both] nature and sense 
experience. ( 132) 
The recognition of the power of reason constitutes our experience of the 
sublime. It will be useful here to focus more specifically on Kant's treat-
ment of the dynamical sublime. Nature, Kant summarizes, is dynamically 
sublime if it is considered as might that is sufficient to excite fear in us, yet 
might without dominion over us. Nature evokes fear, to be more specific, 
"if we judge it in such a way that we merely think of the case where we 
might possibly want to put up resistance against it, and that any resistance 
would in that case be utterly futile" (Judgment 119). In other words, fear 
or terror enters the picture when we see a force of nature as irresistible and 
ourselves as correspondingly impotent. As in the mathematical sublime, 
which entails a defeat of our faculties of representation, 
in the same way, though the irresistibility of nature's might makes us, consid-
ered as natural beings, recognize our physical impotence, it reveals in us at the 
same time an ability to judge ourselves independent of nature, and reveals in 
us a superiority over nature that is the basis of a self-preservation quite differ-
ent in kind .... It calls forth our strength (which docs not belong to nature 
[within us]) to regard as small the [objects] ofour [natural concerns] ... , and 
because of this we regard nature's might ... as yet not having dominance over 
us, as persons, that we should have to bow down to it . . . Hence nature is 
called sublime [erhaben] merely because it elevates [erhebt] our imagination, 
[making] it exhibit those cases where the mind can come to feel its own sub-
limity, which lies in its vocation and elevates it even above nature. (Judgment 
120-21) 
To summarize, then, there are three essential constituents of the dynami-
cal sublime: I) the object or phenomenon before us must be a source of 
fear. It must threaten to overwhelm, destroy, annihilate, or engulf us. 2) 
It must be of such irresistible might as to reveal our total and utter help-
lessness. 3) It therefore calls forth our power to "regard" such helpless-
~--
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ness as ofno consequence. This power to regard, to present to ourselves, 
as it were, our own defeat as insignificant, becomes a triumph that more 
than compensates for any mere physical defeat. 
This triumph, moreover, is fundamentally a triumph of our moral being. 
As Paul Crowther and others have recognized, Kant's concept of the sub-
lime is intimately bound up with his analysis of morality. For Kant, we 
may recall, true moral virtue derives from the will's enactment of universal 
moral laws internally prescribed by reason. Virtuous behavior is only 
possible iffueled by the will's absolute freedom from external determina-
tion, insofar as "the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animal-
ity and even of the entire world of the senses" (Practical Reason 5: I 61-
62). That is, moral action 
is concerned, not with the matter of the action and its presumed results, but 
with its form and with the principle from which it follows: and what is essen-
tially good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the conse-
quences be what they may. (Groundwork 84) 
Insofar as the experience of the dynamical sublime yields a recognition 
of the autonomy of reason from sensible externals, it is an experience that 
belongs to the moral domain. As Crowther points out, sublimity, for Kant, 
"is a predicate ascribed to wills determined by the moral law, that is wills 
that have transcended determination by any natural impulse" (20). Indeed, 
the point that is not sufficiently made in discussions of the Kantian sub-
lime is that the triumph of reason is an affirmation of man's moral auton-
omy. The experience of the sublime discloses the will's absolute freedom 
and therefore the privileged status of human beings as moral agents in the 
fullest sense. 
It is crucial, at this point, to clarify what Kant means when he defines 
morality in terms of the will's transcendence of "natural impulse" or of 
"the entire world of the senses." Moral action cannot in any way be deter-
mined by personal interests or inclinations, since this would presuppose 
an external, contingent motivation for such action. Most remarkably, 
perhaps, Kant's emphasis on moral autonomy leads to the inevitable con-
clusion that morality must be entirely independent of religious belief: 
Is it good to be virtuous only because there is another world, or will not ac-
tions be rewarded rather because they were good and virtuous in themselves? 
Does man's heart not contain immediate moral precepts, and is it absolutely 
necessary to fix our machinery to the other world for the sake of moving man 
here according to his destiny? (Dreams 120) 
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For Kant, as Crowther explains, "to do one's duty on the expectation of 
being rewarded by immortality is to make morality subservient to the 
natural end of the desire for everlasting happiness" (113). 
From this vantage, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the failure or 
defeat of metaphysical sources of meaning would constitute for Kant the 
starkest epitome of all other situations potentially yielding an experience 
of the sublime. As Kant observes, "the only way we can judge a superior-
ity over obstacles is by the magnitude of the resistance" (Judgment 119). 
Therefore, insofar as the degree of sublimity experienced in any given 
situation is dependent upon and proportional to our sense of failure or 
helplessness, the deconstruction of metaphysical belief must be accounted 
as a potential catalyst of the highest sublimity. Though Kant does not 
directly address this configuration in his discussions of the sublime, one 
may suggest, that is, that a defeat of metaphysical understanding (in a 
sense, of theoretical reason) is an event analogous to the defeat of the 
imaginative powers or of the physical self which he identifies with the 
mathematical and the dynamical sublime, respectively.10 As in these two 
versions of the sublime, the defeat of metaphysical constructs requires us
"to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which is of quite a different
kind, and which gives us the courage [to believe] that we could be a match
for nature's seeming omnipotence" (Judgment 120). In this case, "nature's  
seeming omnipotence" takes the form of the universe's titanic incompre-
J.!ensibili!)'. 
It may be useful, in this context, to define the latter experience as the 
"ethical sublime," since to confront the world as inscrutable is to perceive 
it as essentially amoral.11 As we have seen, moreover, the failure of meta-
physical knowledge is crucial to Kant's analysis of morality. Knowledge 
must make room for faith, as Richard Kroner puts it, "not primarily for the 
sake of faith but in order to make room for the will" (53). In other words, 
some vacancy or lacuna in the episteme is the necessary precondition for 
a Kantian construction of the moral self. The full articulation of meta-
physical realities, for Kant, forestalls the launching of the self into a pro-
ject whose direction and shape and meaning are fully non-contingent and 
therefore free from the epistemological constructs that would otherwise 
condition and direct moral agency, thus precluding absolute freedom and 
authentic self-definition. The term "ethical sublime," then, is a condition 
implicitly suggested by Kant. It is a condition that evokes or beckons 
forth an exercise of the moral will by precipitating a particular kind of 
crisis. Just as, in the mathematical sublime, it is the failure of the faculty 
of representation that magnifies the victorious impulse of practical reason, 
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and just as in the dynamical sublime, more particularly, it is precisely the 
impossibility of supremacy over the awesome force of nature that drama-
tizes the superiority of man's moral nature, even so is it in the frustration 
of the human yearning for theodicy, for rational understanding of an in-
comprehensibly tragic universe, that "room for'the will" is greatest, and 
affirmation in a metaphysical and epistemological vacuum becomes an 
ethically sublime gesture (Kroner 53). 
Approaching Wordsworth's "The Ruined Cottage" from the standpoint 
of the Kantian sublime, and in particular the ethical sublime, yields some 
useful insights that potentially resolve the antithetical readings which the 
poem initially produced. It is clear, first of all, that from a Kantian per-
spective the Wanderer's accommodation of Margaret's suffering to Chris-
tian theodicy and the One Life entails a surrender of moral autonomy. The 
Wa~derer can preserve his happiness or serenity in the face of tragedy 
only by reference to a reality outside himself. Only his belief in the 'im-
mortality of the soul, or in the mind's "endless allness,"12 makes him able 
to "afford to suffer/ with those whom he saw suffer" (370-71 ). The Wan-
derer's concluding appeal to the beautiful, in this context, is particularly 
instructive. In the Critique of Judgment Kant contrasts the beautiful and 
the sublime in ways which echo the distinction between the presence and 
absence oftheodicy. The beautiful, according to Kant, is the feeling of 
pleasure in the harmonious interplay of faculties (reason and imagination) 
to which the fonnal qualities of an object give rise ( 44, I 5 I). Though the 
pleasure of the beautiful cannot be experienced by reference to a particular 
concept, it does involve an intuitive perception that the object has a "form 
of finality," that is, "an appearance of design which is able ... to stimulate 
the co-operation of the faculties in a way that promotes the ends of cogni-
tion generally" (Crowther 59). In other words, to experience the beautiful 
is to sense the world as ordered and thus ultimately knowable. As Bar-
nouw puts it, "Beauty ... characterizes perceptions of a world in which we 
can cope and are at home" (504). In this sense, one might argue that the 
perception of beauty parallels the experience of metaphysical certitude, 
even if in the former case the grounds of such certitude cannot be named. 
Barnouw confirms this insight by contrasting the Kantian beautiful and 
sublime in terms of their relationship to moral autonomy: 
for Kant the hannony which beauty reflects or suggests in the workings of our 
mental powers, in their relations to the external world, and in that world taken 
as a whole ... is ultimately in conllict with the nature and the recognition of 
human freedom as autonomy. The experience of the sublime is meant to dis-
rupt and transcend harmonious interaction at all levels. It should throw us 
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back on an awareness of our rational sel!hood as incommensurable to, and 
never ta find adequate realization in, whatever is empirical in ourselves and 
our world. (506) 
Insofar as the experience of beauty is characterized by the feeling that 
nature is suited to human cognition, it implicitly suggests that we inhabit 
a coherent universe. If motivated by a sense of beauty, therefore, moral 
action may be interpreted as the consequence of a self-interested desire to 
participate in some kind of universal harmony. Moral autonomy is sacri-
ficed insofar as human conduct is externally motivated by the desire for 
happiness achieved through what Wordsworth defines as the mind's expe-
rience of "intense unity" (Prose Works 2:354). The beautiful in nature, 
that is, guides us to "a sense sublime/ Of something far more deeply inter-
fused" ("Tintern Abbey" 95-96). Wordsworth's use of the term "sublime" 
in that poem is obviously closer to Kant's conception of beauty than to his 
conception of the sublime.13 And indeed it is the beauty of the "silvered 
o'er" weeds that conveys to the Wanderer a vision of harmony which re-
veals the disjunctions of "sorrow and despair" as ephemeral. It is not 
surprising therefore, to discover in Wordsworth's preface to The Excursion 
a passage that closely echoes Kant's definition of the beautiful: "My voice 
proclaims," the poet confidently asserts, "How exquisitely the individual 
Mind ... to the external World/ Is fitted: -and how exquisitely, too .. 
The external World is fitted to the Mind" (62-63, 66-68). 
As we have seen, however, this fit is unconvincingly delineated in Book 
I of The Excursion. The Wanderer's morally edifying employment of 
metaphysical sources of consolation does not succeed in persuading us that 
Margaret's suffering was somehow redemptive. His concluding appeal to 
the beauty of the ruined cottage betrays the self-serving nature of his re-
sponse to tragedy. The description of the cottage in this case betrays the 
subordination of metaphysical incoherence to the beautiful, and therefore 
of the will to "a momentary pleasure." From a Kantian perspective, that 
is, the Wanderer's moralizing reaction to Margaret's anguish simply mani-
fests the servitude of his will to what the philosopher defines as the "natu-
ral impulse" for happiness. Wordsworth's persistent revisions of the poem, 
granting an ever more prominent place to the Wanderer, reflect the com-
pelling force of such an impulse. 
Of course, by acknowledging, however unintentionally, the ethical prob-
lems inherent in the Wanderer's response, Wordsworth's poem also forces 
the reader to seek alternatives to this response. Such an alternative is in 
fact articulated briefly but movingly by the poem's speaker, the Wanderer's 
interlocutor. It is worth recalling, in this context, that the Wanderer's 
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concluding comments are an admonition against what he perceives to be 
the speaker's excessive grief upon hearing the tale of Margaret's suffe,ing. 
Few readers have noted, however, that the Wanderer offers his advice as 
a consequence of his misreading of the speaker's sorrow. The Wanderer 
assumes that his interlocutor has surrendered to despair, whereas this is 
clearly not the case. Here is the speaker's reaction at the conclusion of 
Margaret's story: 
The old Man ceased: he saw that I was moved; 
From that low bench, rising instinctively 
I turned aside in weakness, nor had power 
To thank him for the talc which he had told. 
I stood, and leaning o'er the garden wall 
Reviewed that Woman's sufferings; and it seemed 
To comfort me while with a brother's love 
I blessed her in the impotence of grief'. (917-24) 
Here, in the speaker's immediate reaction, is an example of what we have 
defined as Kant's ethical sublime. Margaret's tragic sufferings, her empty 
and "torturing hope," her gradual and irreversible ruin, her self-destructive 
despair, are too overwhelming to be somehow contained or sanitized. 
Confronted by such misery, the speaker momentarily assumes Margaret's 
own helplessness-her inability to find, in the face of suffering, the inner 
peace or consolation which the Wanderer will subsequently attribute to 
her. The loss of will that characterizes despair is strikingly conveyed by 
the speaker's almost involuntary movement from the bench, and his turning 
aside, "in weakness," from the desolation of human anguish. And yet, at 
the apex of the total collapse of consolation or understanding-a collapse 
which threatens a paralysis of the will-the speaker's gesture that redeems 
his "weakness" is specifically and emphatically grounded in the absolute 
recognition of this failure: "I blessed her in the impotence of grief' (924). 
The impact of this gesture, that is, lies in the fact that the speaker's bless-
ing, a religious signifier, is delivered precisely at the moment when this 
signifier is implicitly acknowledged as totally inefficacious. 
Wordsworth delineates, in this brief moment, a response to human suf-
fering that eschews the loss of autonomy implicit in both Margaret's de-
spair and the Wanderer's self-serving appeal to metaphysical sources of 
consolation. The speaker's blessing, bereft of its metaphysical supports, 
is a pure act of the will asserting itself in an existential void. It is this 
gesture that permits him to contemplate, "with an interest more mild," 
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That secret spirit of humanity 
Which, 'mid the calm oblivious tendencies 
Of nature, 'mid her plants, and weeds, and flowers, 
And silent overgrowings, still survived. (926-30) 
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Unlike the Wanderer, his interlocutor does not aestheticize the ruined 
cottage; it remains a tragic reminder of nature's obliviousness to the human 
desire for coherence and meaning. However, the speaker's blessing denies 
to nature dominion over the will. It rejects a self-destructive fall into 
despair, and in so doing affirms our capacity to retain our human-
ity-defined by our autonomy-in the face of suffering. 
It is difficult, of course, to prove that the ethical sublime as we have 
traced it in this poem was evoked by Wordsworth intentionally. Indeed, 
Wordsworth's own expressed admiration for the Wanderer would seem to 
argue against this possibility. "The character I have represented in his [the 
Wanderer's] person," he supposedly claimed, "is chiefly an idea of what 
I fancied my own character might have become in his own circumstances" 
(Butler 17). It is worth noting, however, that this statement also implicitly 
acknowledges the poet's difference from the Wanderer, and indeed, it is 
the Wanderer's interlocutor who is identified as the author in the "argu-
ment" of The Excursion. Coleridge's own disappointment with The Excur-
sion, moreover, as failing to embody what he had hoped would be "the 
FIRST GENUINE Pl-lILOSOPI-IIC POEM," suggests that he sensed 
Wordsworth's inability to impose convincingly onto his poem the Wan-
derer's point ofview." 14 The causes of this inability are perhaps revealed 
most poignantly in a letter the poet wrote about his own experience of loss. 
Commenting on the death of his brother, Wordsworth observes, 
A thousand times have I asked myself, as your tender sympathy led me to do, 
"why was he taken away?" and I have answered the question as you have 
done. In fact there is no other answer that can satisfy and lay the mind at rest. 
Why have we a choice and a will, and a notion of justice and injustice, en-
abling us to be moral agents? Why have we sympathies that make the best of 
us so afraid of inflicting pain and sorrow, which yet we see dealt about so 
lavishly by the supreme governor? Why should our notions of right towards 
each other, and to all sentient beings within our influence, differ so widely 
from what appears to be His notion and rule, if everything were to end here? 
Would it not be blasphemy to say that, upon the supposition of the thinking 
principle being destroyed by death, however inferior we may be to the great 
Cause and Ruler of things, we have more of love in our nature than he has? 
The thought is monstrous; and yet how to get rid of it, except on the supposi-
tion of another and a better world, I do not see. (Selincourt 52) 
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Not unlike the Wanderer's concluding appeal to the "unbounded might 
of prayer," Wordsworth's "supposition of another and a better world" 
strikes us as wan by contrast with the powerful "blasphemy" that precedes 
it, defiantly celebrating man's moral will in the face of an immoral God. 
The "Elegiac Stanzas suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle in a Storm," 
written in commemoration of his brother's death, in fact provides us with 
an instructive contrast to the concluding portion of the "Ruined Cottage." 
In the poem, Wordsworth recalls a time when, living near the castle during 
a stretch of beautiful weather, he had imagined himself painting an image 
of it much different from the tenebrous scene depicted by Sir George 
Beaumont. "If mine had been the Painter's hand," he writes, 
I would have painted thee, thou hoary Pile 
Amid a world how ditTcrent from this! 
13eside a sea that could not cease to smile; 
On tranquil land, beneath a sky of bliss. 
Thou shouldst have seemed a treasure house divine 
Of peaceful years; a chronicle of heaven ... ( 17-22) 
The poet's imagined painting, conveying "silent Nature's breathing life," 
becomes an embodiment oftheodicy (28). Beauty, that is, manifests the 
coherence of a universe underpinned by the divine. After his brother's 
death, however, Wordsworth acknowledges that this outlook was a "fond 
illusion" (29). "A deep distress," he writes, "hath humanized my soul," 
and the sign of Wordsworth's new found humanity is his inability to em-
brace the beautiful (36). Beaumont's vision of "this sea in anger, and that 
dismal shore," of"This rueful sky, this pageantry of fear," far more accu-
rately portrays the universe which man inhabits (44, 48). In the last stanza 
of this poem, composed roughly at the same time as "The Pedlar," Words-
worth articulates a remarkably different response to suffering: 
Farewell, farewell the heart that lives alone, 
I loused in a dream, at distance from the Kind! 
Such happiness, wherever it be known, 
Is to be pitied; for 'tis surely blind. (53-56) 
To see the world as the Wanderer does, though it may yield happiness, 
is to embrace an illusory vision that necessitates indifference to or detach-
ment from our "Kind." Far more admirable is the sublimity that comes 
with recognizing the real ugliness of the world and yet confronting with 
"fortitude" the "frequent sights of what is to be borne" (57, 58). "Not 
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without hope we suffer and we mourn" (64) Wordsworth concludes, but 
like the speaker's blessing in "The Ruined Cottage," that hope simply 
embodies the will's refusal to despair; it does not, in other words, have a 
specific metaphysical referent. The radical questioning of the beautiful 
articulated explicitly in the "Elegiac Stanzas" and implicitly in "The Ru-
ined Cottage," therefore, constitutes a warning against art's surrender to 
metaphysics. Indeed, through what we have defined as the ethical sub-
lime, Wordsworth points to art's proper role in relation to human suffering. 
Like the speaker's blessing, aesthetic representation should assert the 
will's moral autonomy by functioning as a kind of prayer uttered in the 
absence of those transcendent referents that would normally sustain it. 
The failure of the Wanderer to reconcile us to the tragedy of Margaret, in 
other words, is the precondition for the story of the "Ruined Cottage" to 
succeed as poetry. By questioning the continuity of aesthetic form and 
metaphysical coherence, Wordsworth implicitly justifies the poetic repre-
sentation of human misery only insofar as it enacts simultaneously art's 
inability to rationalize suffering and its capacity to refuse despair. To 
beget aesthetic form while acknowledging the shapelessness of the uni-
verse is, in Kantian terms, to achieve the ethical sublime. "Suffering," 
writes Wordsworth in an early version of The Borderers, "is permanent, 
obscure and dark,/ And has the nature of infinity."15 It is only by acknow-
ledging this infinity that poetry fulfills a moral function. 
The structure of the ethical sublime, as it has been traced in Wordsworth, 
may prove useful in shedding additional light on the frequently troubled 
relationship of so many Romantic poets to Christian mythology. From the 
perspective outlined here, the antagonisms to such mythology may occa-
sionally turn out to be not so much a question of a perceived failure of 
Christian institutions per se, but of the intrusion by Christian theodicy into  
the sublime space of moral autonomy. The same Kantian grammar of 
failure is evident in Shelley's Prometheus Unbound. Prometheus, of 
course, is here depicted as the very embodiment of the principle of suffer-
ing, stretched to its furthest boundaries of representation. In a remarkable 
blend of both incarnation and spectatorship, he is alternately the suffering 
Christ, whose agony approaches the infinite and the eternal, and the un-
speakably tormented Mary, whose distress comes from her position as 
privileged yet impotent observer of her loved one's agonies. The curtain 
rises on a Prometheus who has been suffering thousands of years of viv-
idly described bodily and psychological torture, but we sense that his 
knowledge of its redemptive value makes it bearable. In his own immod-
est words, his "agony [was] the barrier to [the] else all-conquering foe" 
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( 119-20). Only he has not bent the knee, keeping alive the hope and possi-
bility of moral freedom in the face of Jupiter's universal tyranny. In addi-
tion, his suffering is made tolerable by the Byronic self-possession he 
exhibits throughout. "Yet am I king over myself," he reminds us, "and 
rule the torturing and conflicting throngs within" (11. 492-93). In point 
of fact, there is nothing unique or sublime in the same kind of magnificent 
petulance any stubborn child or bullied schoolboy can endure in the name 
of pride or a fetishized self. If this were the extent of Shelley's portrait of 
moral triumph, it would ring as cliched, as overblown, and as smugly self-
indulgent as Byronic heroism often seems to be. Indeed, there are any 
number of Romantic "apostles of affliction," from Mackenzie through 
Chateaubriand's Rene to Heathcliff and beyond, who see in extremes of 
human suffering a ready calculus for the grandeur of the heroic soul. In 
these cases, a metaphysics of the self, so to speak, simply replaces more 
traditional sources of consolation. 
That is why Prometheus' transition to observer rather than endurer of 
suffering necessarily moves us into a different set of considerations alto-
gether. The shift is as unanticipated by Prometheus as it is unsettling. 
"Tear the veil," his tormentor commands, and the scene of the crucifixion 
is suddenly revealed. At first, it would seem that to invoke the specter of 
the suffering Christ might serve to confirm Prometheus's heroic sense of 
self and to ratify the redemptive value of his anguish. The suffering in 
both cases, to put it plainly, has meaning; it has purpose. In fact, to point 
to the atonement, in the larger context of a discussion of human suffering, 
is to suggest a paradigmatic instance of the anguish of innocence as pro-
foundly meaningful. It is to suggest an archetypal theodicy-an emblem 
of the apparently random, needless, incomprehensible suffering of human-
kind that is miraculously endowed by mysterious theological or metaphysi-
cal realities with value beyond our reckoning. But in Shelley's vision, this 
archetypal atonement is a grand failure. And that failure can be said to 
represent the failure oftheodicy itself, for the Furies reveal to Prometheus 
that Christ's sacrifice has tragically provoked not reconciliation but con-
flict. 
Jn contrast to the God of Milton and of Goethe, whose adversary wills 
Evil but always effects the Good, we now have a perverse cosmic parody. 
Shelley's Savior is one who promises to redeem suffering by turning evil 
to good, only to find the result of his intervention is that "all best things 
are thus confused to ill" (628). Religion, the history of mankind here 
reveals, has served to intensify rather than to extinguish the flames of hate 
and conflict. The flames of war that engulf the world, the "sights too foul 
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to speak and live," are therefore an index, not of human depravity alone, 
but of the defeat of God himself and his moral order. The supreme sacri-
fice, the suffering intended to validate all human suffering, has been ren-
dered hopelessly futile, and the possibility of salvation from our helpless-
ness has been irrefutably denied us. As Prometheus makes the transition 
from re-figuring the suffering of the innocent Christ to helplessly observ-
ing it, and recognizing its lack of efficacy, he is overwhelmed, begging his 
persecutor to "remit the anguish of that [Christ's] lighted stare" (597). The 
very Name with power to save has instead, Prometheus acknowledges, 
"become a curse" (604). In the Kantian grammar, not only metaphysical 
certitude, but the very possibility of metaphysical consolation has been 
annihilated. It is at this point that Prometheus' final words, in acknowledg-
ing the total defeat of theodicy, reveal at the same time the triumph that 
can come only on the ruins of such a failure.16 "Thy words are like a cloud 
of winged snakes," he tells the Fury, "and yet I pity those they torture not" 
(632-33). 
At the very point when Prometheus acknowledges the utter failure of 
Christ's sacrifice, and, by association, of his own, the Fury recognizes she 
has witnessed a more impressive triumph, a triumph suggestive of the 
impotent blessing bestowed upon Margaret, and she retreats from the field. 
"Thou pitiest them?" she asks incredulously. "I speak no more" (634). It 
is precisely at the moment of Prometheus' concession of defeat, of the utter 
futility of redemptive meaning, that futility becomes the very ground of his 
incontestable moral supremacy. What Prometheus pities may be in part 
simply the inability of the wicked to respond with appropriate moral out-
rage to the evil presented to his eyes. But there is clearly more to it than 
this, for there would be nothing astonishing or incomprehensible to the 
Fury if Prometheus merely felt sorry for the stony hearted. Besides, if 
only the capacity for pity were at issue here, the entire Christ episode 
would have been unnecessary as a prelude to Prometheus' sublime gesture. 
But it is in the aftermath of the failure of compassion and the collapse of 
theodicy that this pity is manifested, and this pity thus becomes a moral 
gesture with vastly modified significance-significance, in Kant's words, 
"quite different in kind" (Judgment 121). 
The pity, the compassion, the outraged moral sensibility, have all been 
denied their metaphysical referent. There can no longer be any transcen-
dent meaning or value in such a pity. And with no meaning or value left 
to assail (and the Promethean will not only intact but now purified of any 
metaphysical motive)-flight is all that is left to the Fury. For Kant, as we 
have seen, virtue that exists by reference to a metaphysical principle does 
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not manifest the end of human existence, which is freedom or moral auton-
omy (Crowther 45). It is this end which Prometheus achieves in acknowl-
edging the inefficacy of Christian theodicy while yet reaffirming his 
"imitatio Christi." Although the Prometheus who bleeds from his feet and 
hands is clearly meant to invoke Christian atonement as a myth of selfless 
benevolence that endows suffering with meaning, it is the shattering of that 
myth that creates the ruins necessary for his morally sublime gesture. As 
in the Wanderer's "impotent blessing," this sacrifice is a religious gesture 
without a religious referent.17 
One temptation Shelley offers us is that, in the words of one critic, "the 
ideological drift of Prometheus Unbound may seem evident" (O'Neill 92). 
Thus the dramatic role oflove, the nonviolent unseating of Jupiter, "tyrant 
of the world," that occurs in Act III, and the poetic Utopia of Act IV, 
combine to endow the poem in the eyes of most readers with its value as 
 political and philosophical allegory. 18 But such a reading may miss the 
importance of those developments as occurring upon the ruins of the fail-
ure we have just witnessed. In such a context, subsequent gestures of 
millennial jubilee should not be seen-or seen only-as the politics ofa 
 poet functioning as "unacknowledged legislator." This would be to sim-
plify Jupiter's collapse as a merely historical event, and everything that 
follows as secular eschatology.19 But in the aftermath oftheodicy's col-
lapse, there is no history-only chaos. And in the refusal to acquiesce to 
this chaos, Shelley's gesture of utopian creation has become, like Words-
worth's blessing, aesthetic in an intensely moral way. We are reminded 
here of Kant's insistence that the sublime "is an emotion, and so it seems 
to be seriousness, rather than play, in the imagination's activity" (Judgment 
98). 
The subjecting of Christian theodicy to such obliteration as we have seen 
at Shelley's hand need not be construed as an anti-Christian gesture; cer-
tainly the purposes such an edifice served, if only by its obliteration, are 
conducive of what Kant considers the moral victory that matters most. 
More than half a century after Shelley, Dostoevsky would echo the most 
sublime gesture of The Excursion's narrator and of Prometheus, in a set-
ting that seems almost calculated to prove that the ethical sublime can 
transcend a Christian frame of reference without wounding it. In The 
Brothers Karamazov, Ivan elicits from Alyosha, at grievous cost, the 
young priest's confession that he cannot countenance that moral universe 
to which he has devoted his life: 
"Tell me frankly, I appeal to you-answer me: imagine that it is you yourself 
who arc erecting the edifice of human destiny with the aim of making men 
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happy in the end, of giving them peace and contentment at last, but to do that 
it is absolutely necessary, and indeed quite inevitable, to torture to death 
only one tiny creature ... Would you consent to be the architect of those 
conditions? Tell me and do not lie!" 
"No, I wouldn't," Alyosha said softly. (287) 
Moments later, of course, follows the tale of the Grand Inquisitor, in 
which Christ kisses his captor who has just condemned him to the stake. 
At the story's conclusion, Alyosha's final gesture is to kiss his heretical 
brother on the lips. "Plagiarism!," cries Ivan, but he has misunderstood 
(309), for the prisoner of the Grand Inquisitor kissed his accuser as gesture 
of forgiveness, and as an emblem of the ideal he personified. But Alyo-
sha's kiss, like the blessing of Margaret and Prometheus' pity, follows upon 
the ruins of a moral order that has failed him. It is art, but it is not plagia-
rism. 
Notes 
1. Arthur Danto, "Francis Bacon," Embodied Meanings: Critical Essays and 
Aesthetic Meditations (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1994), 100-1. 
2. Except where otherwise specified, all quotations of Wordsworth's poetry will 
be from Poetical Works. In this edition, 711e Excursion is based on the 1849-50 
text. 
3. For different approaches to Wordsworth and the problem of human suffering, 
sec studies by James H. Averill, David Gervais, and Karen Swann. 
4. Manuscript citations arc from the reading texts that Butler provides in his 
study. 
5. As is well known, Wordsworth's notion of the underlying unity of all things 
in nature was heavily influenced by Coleridge. See, for example, the latter's 
"Religious Musings": 
'Tis the sublime of man, 
Our noontide Majesty, to know ourselves 
Parts and proportions of one wond'rous whole: 
This fraternizes man, this constitutes 
Our charities and bearings. But 'tis God 
Diffus'd thro' all, that doth make all one whole. ( 127-31) 
or "The Eolian Harp": 
0 the one life within us and abroad, 
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul, 
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light, 
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where- (25-28) 
Butler quotes a verse from one of the working manuscripts of "The Ruined 
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Cottage"-which does not appear in the reading texts he compiled-that clearly 
suggests Coleridge's influence: "In all things he [the Pedlar] saw one life, and felt 
that it was joy" ( 16). 
6. See, in this regard, Augustine's rather harsh judgment: "Only in the 
impossible event of good-will being malevolent, could a man who is truly and 
sincerely filled with pity desire that there should be miserable people for him to 
pity" (36). 
7. Theresa M. Kelley traces in great detail Wordsworth's tendency to use the 
beautiful as the source of an "ethos of coherence" (Revisionary Aesthetics 145). 
Kelley, too, however, is unconvinced by the "aesthetics of containment" brought 
to bear in the Pedlar's speech at the end of "The Ruined Cottage." 
8. Prom within 
Her solitary infant cried aloud: 
Then, like a blast that dies away self-stilled, 
The voice was silent. (735-38) 
9. The self-serving nature of the Wanderer's consoling vision has also been 
noted by Jonathan Barron and Kenneth R. Johnston, who argue that the 
Wanderer's narrative is fueled by his sense of guilt at failing to aid Margaret in her 
distress. 
I 0. Indeed, one could argue that the failure oftheodicy is implicit in both these 
versions of the sublime, insofar as they entail a recognition of incomprehensible 
magnitude or of insurmountable might that can only be resisted by recourse to out 
inner resources, and not by recourse to external ll}t!taphysical truths (i.e.: notions 
of the soul's immortality, etc.). 
11. We are using the term "ethical" here in the same way that Kant uses the 
terms "mathematical" and "dynamical." Just as the magnitude of nature leads to 
the mind's recognition of its capacity to embrace the concept of infinity, and just 
as the power of nature provokes the mind's recognition of its ability to imagine 
resistance to such power, so the amorality of the universe leads to a recognition 
of the will's moral autonomy. 
12. The expression is found in Thomas Allsop, Letters, Conversations, and 
Recollections of S. T. Coleridge, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 
I :97-99, and quoted in Thorpe 210. . 
13. In "Wordsworth, Kant, and the Romantic Sublime," Theresa Kelley usefully 
delineates the differences between Wordsworth's and Kant's conceptions of the 
sublime. Although for both sublime experience entails "the mind's apprehension 
of internal powers that cannot be accorded limit or adequate expression," 
Wordsworth, following Coleridge, articulated a "preference for a sublime that is 
free of the combat between reason's intellectual mastery and nature's magnitude 
or might which characterizes Kant's model." Por Wordsworth and Coleridge, in 
fact, it is nature that leads the mind to "a sense sublime/ Of something far more 
deeply interfused": "the inner conflict and sense of possible hazard which 
permeate the Kantian sublime have no place in Wordsworth's discussion of the 
mind's experience of'intense unity' with those objects which impress it with ideas 
of power and duration" (131-33). The distinction between Wordsworth's own 
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conceptions of the sublime and the beautiful traced by Kelley in Wordsworth's 
Revisionary Aesthetics is not relevant to the current discussion, since it is to Kant's 
conception of the beautiful that Wordsworth's sublime is being linked here. For 
a somewhat different reading that emphasizes the similarities between Kantian and 
Wordsworthian conceptions of the sublime, see Eve Walsh Stoddard. It should 
be clear, however, that our discussion does not rely on a demonstrable link 
between Kant and Wordsworth. Rather, we make use of the structure of the 
Kantian sublime as a critical tool which allows us to shed light on Wordsworth's 
complex engagement with suffering, art, and morality. 
14. Quoted by Butler, 16. In his overview of 111e Excursion, William Howard 
also points out the crucial role of the speaker in resisting the Wanderer's 
subsumption of "human misery into the larger pattern of loss and consolation." 
Throughout The Excursion, according to Howard, Wordsworth explores through 
the figure of the narrator "the mind's resistance to the internal pressure of 
ontological revelation" (516). 
15. Quoted in Jonathan Wordsworth, 59. 
16. Stuart Sperry expresses a similar view in his claim that, "[Prometheus] does 
not survive through the power of faith, which at its strongest is closest to what 
Shelley most of all detested: 'the cold security of undoubted triumph' of the God 
of Paradise lost and his absolute foreknowledge" (249). 
17. O'Neill will even argue that the poem goes so far in the direction away from 
reference as to run the risk "of laying claim to an imaginative autonomy which is 
self-enclosed," asking to be read (here he cites Geoffrey Ward) "not as pointers 
towards external reality but as constituting reality itsclr'(92). Ward will in fact 
argue that "a fundamental poetic operation in Prometheus Unbound is the 
discharge of words out of their customary and singular nature into the area of 
proliferating, thence indeterminate, thence inexhaustible meaning" (202). Here 
we would insist that if the Kantian structure of failure tells us anything, it is that 
such a reading risks confusing the poem's status as an "impotent blessing" with 
some kind of naive solipsism or a simple play of signifiers. 
18. Donald H. Reiman, to give but one typical example of this critical tendency, 
sees the Promethean ethic as informed by Shelley's perceptions of the French 
Revolution; he finds the drama's pivotal moment in the fifth scene of Act II, which 
"makes clear Asia's role as the personification of beauty and the goal oflove, the 
anthropomorphic form of the abstract principle that, Shelley believed, underlies
all the creativity of the universe" (62-64). 
19. Ross G. Woodman agrees that critics have underestimated the "movement
away from an allegory of time," and suggests that this shift is really toward
apocalypse rather than millennium ( 170). 
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